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Executive summary 
This report analyses the conditions under which online security and privacy seals (OSPS) can be 
deployed to support users to make an informed trust decision about Web services and their 
providers with respect to the provided security and privacy. This report is motivated by the 
numerous policy documents, that mention marks, seals, logos, icons, (collectively referred as OSPS) 
as a mean enabling users to judge on the trustworthiness of services offered on the Web. 
The field of OSPSs has also developed in maturity.  Therefore, we aim at analysing the current 
situation and identified key challenges for online signals in practise.  Based on these challenges, this 
report identifies possible solutions and corresponding recommendations and next steps that ENISA 
and other stakeholders should follow for enabling users in judging on the trustworthiness of services 
offered on the Web. 
The key challenges and corresponding recommendations of this report are: 
 Lack of awareness. Many users are not aware of the existence of OSPSs at all. Furthermore, 
they are not aware on which signals they can and should base their decision on as there are 
many including a few which are not trustworthy. Partners from the Safer Internet 
Programme, working groups on awareness raising from different institutions should 
provide educational material to spread knowledge of the existence and meaning of OSPS. 
 Lack of standards. As a result of different design requirements and business models a broad 
range of seals is available today. This variety makes it difficult for users to decide whether 
one seal provides stronger protection than another.  Standardisation of OSPS will be 
important to make them easily recognisable and correctly understood. Standardisation 
bodies should also define standards for trustworthy OSPSs.  This will also improve user 
experience as they do not need to remember as many OSPS providers as they need today. 
 Lack of validity checks. Most of those who are aware do not check the validity of the online 
signals; even worse some signals are merely images on the web page and as such very hard 
to check. Hence, forgeries are possible and easy. Service providers need to provide users 
with OSPSs that can be automatically checked (for example, in the form of cryptographic 
certificates). Web browser developers need to implement these automatic checks. 
However, pure market forces are not very likely to lead to this ideal situation. Thus, policy 
makers (at EU level and national level) should investigate the enforcement of 
corresponding standardized mechanisms for Web browsers.  Furthermore, they should 
investigate strategies in case promises made regarding seals are not met.  
 Lack of usability. Given the intrinsic complexity of Web services it is very likely that the 
result of an evaluation by an OSPS issuer is not just ‘pass’ or ‘fail’ but multi-dimensional. As 
there is neither space nor are users generally willing to read long explanations, researchers 
and web designers need to develop corresponding icons communicating the results. These 
icons could be based on research on privacy icons.  Note, designers need to take care of 
cultural and legal differences. 
 Lack of presence. The effectiveness of trust signals needs to be improved, and this is likely to 
occur when a more mature market with well-known players (online service providers) is 
achieved; and also when users attain a more precise understanding of their meaning of a 
trust seal in a web page. Regulatory bodies at EU and national level should set incentives 
for service providers to obtain online security and privacy seals.  
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1 Introduction 
In online environments, end users are interacting with a variety of Web services on a daily basis. 
Many Web services already exist and more and more are provided every day.  Users have to make 
decisions about the level of trust they place in these services.  This trust decision does not only 
include the trust that a certain service level is provided, but has also a range of privacy and security 
implications.  
For many users and for various reasons (including their lack of knowledge, access, and time), it is 
difficult (if not impossible) to make a well-grounded trust decision. Hence, policy makers propose in 
several policy documents (see Section 2) the establishment of online security and privacy seals 
(OSPS).  The idea of online security and privacy seals is the following:   
During an evaluation it is checked if a Web service of a provider fulfils security and privacy 
requirements that are defined for the respective OSPS. After a positive evaluation the OSPS is issued 
(usually) by a third party who was contracted to conduct the evaluation. Afterwards, this approval 
needs to be communicated to the user (e.g. in terms of self-claimed text and/or pictograms on the 
Web page, or as electronic certificate). In order to avoid fraud it must be possible to verify whether 
the provided information is authentic. These three steps form a chain of trust (Figure 1) that needs 
to be formed from the OSPS issuer to the awareness of the user. Thus, this approach is very similar 
to well-known and established approaches from real world such as tüv1, GS2 and CE3. 
 
  
 
 
In this report, we aim to analyse this idea, identify challenges which should be addressed for a 
successful establishment of OSPS. The document provides solutions or directions for future research 
to tackle each of the identified challenges. In the case that there is not yet an appropriate solution 
available, we provide (research) directions to develop a solution and point to mitigation strategies. 
Furthermore, the report reflects economic aspects of OSPSs. From a market perspective, their 
primary goal is to induce competitive pressure and steer the market towards more secure and 
privacy preserving Web services.  They enable Web services to differentiate themselves from 
competitors by obtaining such OSPSs and by building up a good reputation in the market place. 
Correspondingly, we first (Section 2) provide an overview of policy documents mentioning and/or 
recommending the establishment of OSPSs.  Afterwards (Section 3), we analyse the first aspect of 
OSPS namely the evaluation by defining adequate security and privacy requirements as well as 
corresponding evaluation methods. In Section 4 we address communication challenges and 
corresponding solutions. Moreover, in Section 5 we address verification challenges and the 
                                                          
1 Technischer Überwachungs-Verein, English: Technical Inspection Association, associa 
2 German seal for products; its certification process is regulated in “Produktsicherheitsgesetz” 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/cemarking/index_en.htm 
Figure 1 Trust Chain for Online Security and Privacy Seals 
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appropriate solutions.  We analyse economic aspects of OSPSs (Section 6) and conclude the paper 
with a list of recommendations (Section 7).  Finally, we include two annexes, which provide in-depth 
insights on security and privacy assessment challenges, and research directions in privacy icons as 
tool for human computer interaction.  
  
On the security, privacy and usability of online seals 
An overview 
 
Version December 2013 
 
Page  3 
2 The policy context  
Recently published policy documents refer to OSPSs that would improve the interactions of users in 
online environments.  In this section we set the current context by examples; it is not intended to list 
all the policy documents that mention signals.  
2.1 Strategic policy documents related to ICT and cyberspace 
Digital Agenda for Europe  
The Digital Agenda for Europe4, one of the European Commission (EC) initiatives of the Europe 2020 
Strategy, identifies policies and actions to maximize the benefits of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT). Actions are proposed as part of the modernization of the European personal data 
protection regulatory framework in order “to make it more coherent and legally certain”. For 
example, action #4 is specifically dedicated to the “review of the European data protection 
regulatory framework with a view to enhancing individuals’ confidence and strengthening their 
rights” and creating “EU online trustmarks5 for retail websites”. Such an action is proposed to 
improve the competition, to enhance consumer protection and to allow for comparability of prices 
and products across the EU. 
The Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union 
As a step to implement the Digital Agenda, the European Commission together with the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, have published6 a cybersecurity 
strategy for the European Union in February 2013. The cybersecurity strategy7 – “An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace” – provides a list of priorities and actions aimed at enhancing cyber resilience of 
information systems, reducing cybercrime and strengthening EU international cyber-security policy 
and cyber defence, while promoting values of freedom and democracy and ensuring the safe growth 
of the digital economy.  
As a part of this strategy, ENISA together with all relevant stakeholders is invited to contribute in 
developing technical and good practice guidelines for Network and Information Security (NIS) that 
take into account data protection.  With relevance to this paper, the strategy proposes to increase 
cooperation and transparency about security in ICT products and the improvement of “the 
information available to the public by developing security labels or kite marks helping the consumer 
navigate the market.” to promote a single market for cybersecurity products. 
2.2 Protection of personal data in the EU 
Transparency of personal data processing for the data subjects is an important legal privacy principle. 
Here, data processing is considered transparent for data subjects if they are in control of their data 
and gave informed consent to the processing.8 Information that needs to be given to data subjects 
for a valid consent covers typically the elements of information listed in Article 10 of the Data 
                                                          
4 European Commission, A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010)245, 19.05.2010, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R%2801%29:EN:NOT (last accessed on 30.10.2012). 
5 Key words are underlined by editor in the cited paragraphs (here and in following subsections) to highlight the message. 
6EU Cybersecurity plan to protect open internet and online freedom and opportunity, Reference: IP/13/94, 07/02/2013 available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-94_en.htm?locale=en 
7 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace - JOIN(2013) 1 final, 7/2/2013, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=1667 
8 Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party.  Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, 01197/11/EN, WP187, adopted 13th June 2011. 
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Protection Directive 95/46/EC9; includes at the very least the identity of the data controller, and the 
data processing purposes. Moreover, further information needs to be given in so far as such further 
information is necessary to guarantee fair data processing; this can include the recipients or 
categories of recipients of the data, whether replies to questions are obligatory or voluntary, and 
information about the individual’s rights. 
Recently, the Art.29 Working Party discussed in their Opinion 5/2012 on Cloud Computing10 a lack of 
transparency with regard to the cloud services’ processing operations. Privacy threats may arise from 
the controller not knowing or not informing the data subjects about the chain with multiple 
processors and subcontractors, different geographic locations, transfer to third countries outside the 
EEA or disclosure requests by law enforcement.  The later aspects are important even if data is 
processed at a services side located in the EEA; data transfers to the US may take place and become 
subject for requests by US law enforcement services. 
Moreover, data subjects are often not well informed about the applicable consumer laws and rights, 
especially if cloud brokers or mediators are involved in cross-border e-commerce transactions.11 
Privacy notices in the form of long legal statements are, however, usually neither read nor easily 
understood by end users.  In Section 5.2, we will discuss work on how such information to be 
provided in privacy policies can be complemented by policy icons for illustrating policy elements in 
an easily noticeable and comprehensible manner.  
The Communication on personal data protection 
As a key objective of the comprehensive approach on data protection in the general frame of the 
strengthening of the rights of the individuals, the Commission communication on a comprehensive 
approach on personal data protection in the European Union12, supports the enhancement of the 
control of the citizens over their personal data. In this context, “[…] the Commission will explore the 
possible creation of EU certification schemes (e.g. ‘privacy seals’) for ‘privacy-compliant’ processes, 
technologies, products and services.” 
The proposed Regulation on data protection 
In January 2012 the European Commission proposed regulation on data protection that will replace 
the existing Data Protection Directive. 13 The proposal for the new regulation contains specific 
provisions relevant to certification, data protection seals, and marks. In Article 39, of the proposed 
regulation is stated “[…] the Member States and the Commission shall encourage, in particular at 
European level, the establishment of data protection certification mechanisms and of data protection 
seals and marks, allowing data subjects to quickly assess the level of data protection provided by 
controllers and processors” and further that “the Commission may lay down technical standards for 
certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks and mechanisms to promote and 
recognize certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks”. 
                                                          
9 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal L No. 281, 23.11.1995. 
10 Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2012 on Cloud Computing, 01037/12/EN, WP 196, adopted July 1st 2012. 
11 This was one of the elicited challenges of an HCI focus group meeting organized by the EU FP7 project A4Cloud with participants from 
Konsument Europa, which took place in February 2013 at Karlstad University (see A4Cloud Deliverable D:C-7.1 on General HCI Principles 
and Guidelines – forthcoming). 
12 European Commission, A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union, Communication COM(2010) 609, 
04 November, 2010, p. 9, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf (last accessed on 
04.10.2011).  
13 European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 
final, 25 January 2012, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (last 
accessed on 20.02.2012)   
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The European Parliament (EP) provided amendments 14  in January 2013; and some of the 
amendments mention standardized icon-based representations. The amendment 51 for preamble 
(77) adds the need for reliable and verifiable possibilities to assess the seals and marks used: “In 
order to enhance transparency and compliance with this Regulation, the establishment of 
certification mechanisms, data protection seals and marks should be encouraged, allowing data 
subjects to quickly, reliably and verifiably assess the level of data protection of relevant products and 
services.” Although paragraph 3 of article 39, which referred to delegated acts of the EC for laying 
down technical standards for certification mechanisms and data protection seals and marks, was 
removed, new paragraphs were introduced, namely:  
 paragraph 1a stating “The data protection certification mechanisms shall set down the 
formal procedure for the issue and withdrawal of a data protection seal or mark and ensure 
the financial and factual independence and proficiency in data protection of the issuing 
organisation. The criteria for certification, the individual results of a successful certification 
and an intelligible meaningful summary justification shall be made readily accessible to the 
public.”  
 paragraph 1b says “The data protection certification mechanisms shall in particular ensure 
compliance with the principles set out in Article 5, 23 and 30, the obligations of the controller 
and the processor, and the data subject’s rights.” In the Justification is mentioned that “[a]ny 
certification mechanisms must set out the formal procedure for the issuance and withdrawal 
of the seal and must be independent” and ”[a]ny certification mechanisms must ensure 
compliance with data protection principles and data subject rights”.  
The need for icon-based information about privacy policies is stated in the EP report in Amendment 
118, referring to Article 13: “Information for data subjects shall be provided in a format offering data 
subjects the information needed to understand their position and make decisions in an appropriate 
way. Therefore the controller shall provide and communicate its data protection policies through an 
easily understandable icon-based mode of description for the different types of data processing, their 
conditions and consequences.” In the following Amendment is further stated that icon-based mode 
of description should cover “[…] the nature of the processing, duration of storage, transfer or erasure 
of data by establishing icons or other instruments in order to provide information in a standardised 
way.” Note: at the moment of writing, the draft regulation on data protection is still highly volatile 
and hence the above remarks might not reflect the situation at reading time correctly, cf 
MEMO/13/923 22/10/201315 of the European Commission. 
2.3 Communication on e-commerce and other online services 
The Communication16 “A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-
commerce and online services” published in January 2012, list among its 5 priorities the 
improvement of “operator information and consumer protection”. Action 9 of the communication 
includes “contributing to the creation of trustmarks” according to the recent directive on Directive 
                                                          
14 European Parliament report on the Data Protection Regulation: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/pr/922/922387/922387en.pdf  
European Parliament report on the Data Protection Directive: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/pr/923/923072/923072en.pdf  
EC memo “Commission welcomes European Parliament rapporteurs' support for strong EU data protection rules”, 8th on January 2013, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/m13_4_en.pdf  
15 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-923_en.htm 
16 European Commission, COM (2011)942, 11.1.2012 “A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce 
and online services” context described at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/communication_2012_en.htm (last visited 
October 2012), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF (last visited October 
2012).  
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2011/62/EU of 8 June 2011, amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use. 
2.4 Community code relating to medical products  
The Community code relating to medical products for human use17 has been amended (Directive 
2011/62/EU of 8 June 2011) and the new consolidated version specifies the common grounds for 
“common logo […] clearly displayed on every page of the website that relates to the offer for sale at 
a distance to the public of medicinal products.” A harmonized, common logo across the EU requires, 
as stated in the article 85c of the Directive, implementation acts to address “the technical, electronic 
and cryptographic requirements for verification of the authenticity of the common logo” and “the 
design of the common logo”. 
  
                                                          
17 The consolidated version was published in 2011, after the publication of Directive 2011/62/EU of 8 June 2011 amending Directive 
2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, as regards the prevention of the entry into the legal 
supply chain of falsified medicinal products. OJ L 174 of 1.7.2011 available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2001L0083:20110721:EN:PDF (last visited October 2012). 
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3 Security and privacy requirements and evaluation 
Users’ trust in a service is roughly defined as the users perceived likelihood that their requirements 
to the service are fulfilled. This includes requirements w.r.t. security, privacy, data protection, and 
quality of service. In this report, we focus on privacy and security requirements. Due to the non-
functional nature of these requirements, users cannot assess directly if the requirement is fulfilled or 
not. However, the evaluation whether a service provides adequate security and privacy, can be done 
by a third party (the OSPS issuer).  
There are many factors to consider when evaluating the trustworthiness (i.e. privacy and security) of 
Web services such as scope, granularity, validity period, etc. (see Annex A for detailed description of 
all these factors). Currently, different OSPS issuers have different scopes and focuses. Some narrowly 
focus on privacy compliance whereas others also consider technical security and privacy aspects. 
Evaluation methods range from self-disclosure to in-depth penetration tests and on-site audits, see 
Annex A: .  Consequently, different issuers consider different sets of requirements and different 
evaluation methods which they are supposed to describe in the seal description e.g. on their Web 
page.  
In this section we describe the problems and challenges with the current requirement definitions 
and evaluation approaches.  
3.1 Challenges  
With the existence of OSPS we can observe a shift from users making trust decisions about Web 
services to making trust decision about OSPS issuers (Challenge 1). However, issuer regulation is 
almost non-existent, making the situation even worse since everyone can become an OSPS issuer. 
Note that trust in OSPS has two aspects. One is, trust that the OSPS issuers properly check what they 
claim to check. In addition, trust that the OSPS issuers select adequate security and privacy 
requirements and fitting evaluation methods. But, it is not clear what adequate means and for 
whom it is adequate. Currently, there is a wide range of OSPS issuers, which use different evaluation 
methods. From this starting point, it is hard if not impossible to agree on a common list of adequate 
security and privacy requirements and corresponding evaluation methods. Thus, users have 
themselves to actually check and judge the expressiveness of the undertaken evaluation, i.e., 
whether the addressed requirements and applied evaluation methods are adequate for them 
(Challenge 2). However, the lay users lack sufficient expertise in the field to enable them to make an 
informed decision. As such, users cannot judge on the meaning and value of OSPS. For example, 
when asking participants about the meaning of an OSPS, misconceptions have been identified18 as 
some users believed that OSPSs indicate that a web page is free of viruses or that it has been verified 
by the company that provides the payment method. This situation can lead to misinterpretations by 
users: e.g., it might be that only the data protection policy as such has been evaluated while users 
believe that its implementation has been evaluated too. Thus users assign a higher trust level to the 
corresponding Web service then appropriated.  
Note even for experts, it is a cumbersome and error prone task to decide if the undertaken 
evaluation is adequate. In addition, experts are expensive. This forces service provides to trade off 
evaluation quality and the cost for the evaluation (see also Section 6 for a discussion of the 
economic aspects).  
                                                          
18 I. Kirlappos, A. Sasse, N. Harvey; Why trust seals don’t work: A study of user perception and behaviour, University College London, 
Department of Computer Science 
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Another challenge is that it is difficult if at all possible for the user to check whether (exactly) the 
same service is in place than the one that has been evaluated (Challenge 3). 
3.2 Solutions 
In this section we present solutions and ideas to address the challenges presented above. 
Solution 1. There exist different models to address the challenge that users need to judge on the 
trustworthiness of certificate issuers in other security contexts: e.g. (1) The Common Criteria model 
distinguishes between the certificate issuer and the evaluation body which are independent 
institutions. The evaluation body is accredited by the certificate issuer. Furthermore, the evaluation 
body conducts the evaluation according to the Common Criteria rules and the certificate issuer 
observers the process and finally issues the certificate. Thus, users do not need to know and judge 
on the trust of all the different evaluation bodies but only on the few certificate issuers (usually only 
one institution per country) (2) Hierarchical public key infrastructures such as the SMIME 
certification model, distinguishes between root CAs and ‘standard’ CAs. Again the root CAs accredits 
the standard CAs to issue certificates. However, root CAs are not involved in the process of issuing 
certificates.  Similarly to the previous model, users only need to know and judge on the trust of all 
the standard CA but only the few root CAs. Correspondingly, one of these two models is 
recommended for OSPSs in order to address Challenge 1. As such, standards for OSPS issuer 
accreditation are required.  
Solution 2. The problem that different issuers use different requirements and different evaluation 
methods. In addition, it is up to the user to decide which are adequate and which not - this should 
be addressed by corresponding standards. These standards should define for which type of Web 
service (including which type of data requested from the user) which security and privacy 
requirements need to be ensured, how the OSPS issuers have to conduct the evaluation and how 
often it needs to be repeated. Due to the economic influence (see Section 6), future research is 
necessary to figure out whether one set of requirements and evaluation methods for each Web 
service type is adequate and as such either a Web service ensures them or not or whether different 
levels are distinguished (similar to the different evaluation assurance levels in the Common Criteria 
context). Note, the first case is easier to communicate to the user than the later one (see Section 4 
for communication aspects).  
Challenge 3 is not entirely solvable. OSPSs need to be bound to the originally certified service. As 
long as a service is non-customized software only, e.g., an app, the OPSP can be bound to the service 
using a cryptographic hash. However online services are often highly customized and contain non-
electronic parts. Here traditional policy enforcement can help, that is, OSPS requires regularly re-
evaluation.  Moreover, this re-evaluation should happen randomly to avoid that the service provider 
can prepare to deliver better service just for the time of the evaluation.  Moreover, issuers need to 
take measures that allow service users to file complaints, if there is a suspicion of fraud. 
Furthermore, a non-technical solution could be the implementation of liability rules by the 
regulators. 
Additional remarks 
In the context of this year’s work, ENISA in parallel to this activity also conducted a study of the 
experiences from using certification schemes in case of Information Security Management Systems. 
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The results of this work are reported in the ENISA survey19 on certification practice in EU Member 
States. Although the authors understand that it is not sound to assume that the experiences from 
the deployment and use of security certification schemes can also be applicable in the case of 
privacy seals, we believe that it is of worth to note that in the context of the privacy debate, seals 
are considered as means to increase the trust of users towards an offered online services. However, 
the experience from the use of security seals indicates that the biggest benefit coming from their 
deployment and use is not that much on increasing the level of security that users feel but rather in 
improving the level of preparedness of an organisation that deploys them.  
  
                                                          
19
 Security certification practice in the EU. Information Security Management Systems - A case study, ENISA study, 2013, aavailable at: 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/library/deliverables/security-certification-practice-in-the-eu-information-
security-management-systems-a-case-study 
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4 Communication Issues 
The result of the OSPS issuers’ evaluation about a service needs to be communicated to the user. 
Obviously, it is important that users are aware of OSPS in general but also that the evaluation results 
are communicated in a way that users perceive them and take them into account when judging on 
the trustworthiness of the offered Web service. Only if this is the case, can the user make an 
informed decision about the trustworthiness of an offered Web service. Currently, OSPS issuers 
usually provide only one OSPS and the evaluation result is either pass or fail. In case of pass the 
result is communicated by integrating a corresponding pictogram on the service provider’s web 
page. The position of the pictogram on the web page is decided by the Web service.  
4.1 Challenges 
In the empirical study on OSPSs conducted in Germany20 only 40% out of 112 respondents knew the 
concept of OSPSs in the web. Similar results where reproduced for the entire European population 
by The European Consumer Centres’ Network.21 Without knowing this concept it is obviously not 
possible to consider OSPSs when judging the trustworthiness of Web services (Challenge 1). 
Nowadays, OSPS are not the only security and privacy indicator users consider. Others are e.g. the 
green bar in terms of an extended validation certificate or results from external services such as Web 
of Trust. Several researchers showed that average users do not consider or only rarely consider any 
of these security and privacy indicators when assessing the trustworthiness of a service: Turner et 
al.22, for instance, showed that the service provider’s reputation, previous experiences with the 
service and third party recommendations play a role for ordinary users to feel secure when using a 
web service. Egelman et al.23 showed that so-called trust signals for end users on a web page are: 
 look and feel of a web page (including design, writing, and grammar, no pop ups and no/less 
advertisement),  
 the fact that the web page and the company are known (also phishing Amazon pages look 
trustworthy as Amazon is well known and the page looks the same),  
 the data requested (users seem to be scared if too much information is requested).   
Researchers also evaluated the relevance of OSPSs for users’ trust decisions while interacting with a 
Web service:  An empirical study on OSPSs conducted in 2011 in Germany20 showed that OSPSs are 
not the main signal for users to judge a Web service as trustworthy. On the question how to decide 
whether or not to trust a Web service only 21% of the users selected “displaying an OSPS” as 
criterion of their decision.  Similar results were found by an empirical study conducted in the UK24: 
several web pages were presented to the 62 participants to assess their trust decisions; some 
displayed OSPSs while others did not.  It turned out that 38% of the participants did not notice any 
                                                          
20 M. Volkamer, F. Karayumak, M. Kauer, D. Halim and R. Bruder; Security versus Trust Signals in 2011 in Germany 
21
 Trust marks report 2013, ”Can I trust the trust mark?”, ECC-Network, 2003, available at (last visited December 2013): 
http://www.konsumenteuropa.se/PageFiles/159275/Trust%20Mark%20Report%202013.pdf 
22 Turner, C. W., M. Zavod & W. Yurcik, “Factors that Affect the Perception of Security and Privacy of E-commerce Web Sites”. Proceedings 
of the Fourth International Conference on Electronic Commerce Research, Dallas TX, November 2001. 
23 Egelman, Serge, Cranor, L. F., & Hong, J. (2008). You’ve been warned: an empirical study of the effectiveness of web browser phishing 
warnings. Proceeding of the twenty-sixth annual SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems, CHI ’08 (pp. 1065–1074). 
New York, NY, USA: ACM. doi:10.1145/1357054.1357219  
Wu, Min, Miller, R. C., & Garfinkel, S. L. (2006). Do security toolbars actually prevent phishing attacks? CHI ’06 (pp. 601–610). New York, 
NY, USA: ACM. doi:10.1145/1124772.1124863  
The Influence of trustworthiness of website layout on security perception of websites: Michaela Kauer, Florian Kiesel, Felix Ueberschaer, 
Melanie Volkamer, Ralph Bruder; In: Current Issues in IT Security 2012, vol. I, no. 18, p. 215-220, Duncker & Humblot, 2012. ISBN 978-3-
86113-115-1. ISSN 1862-7625. 
24 I. Kirlappos, A. Sasse, N. Harvey; Why trust seals don’t work: A study of user perception and behaviour, University College London, 
Department of Computer Science 
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of the displayed OSPS, while only 20% of them noticed all.  Again, users gave value to other aspects 
mainly related to professionalism.  Thus, another challenge for communicating OSPSs is the general 
mismatch between trust signals and any security and privacy indicator (including OSPSs) (Challenge 
2). 
This mismatch is caused by the way these indicators, including OSPSs, are communicated to the 
users; namely either as passive or active interventions. Nowadays, passive interventions dominate. 
Passive interventions are either part of the content of the Web page, as pictograms or provided by 
services like Norton Safe Web. Furthermore, browsers are able to integrate them, e.g., chrome’s 
signal lights (green, orange, red) extension LinkExtend 25   Studies show that these passive 
interventions are rarely noticed or taken into account by users when evaluating the trustworthiness 
of a Web service. This is mainly caused by the users’ focus on the required service and not on 
security. This is in particular true for OSPSs as they are displayed at different places by different Web 
services. Here, the actual position of such information on the screen turned out to make a 
difference, e.g., displaying it on the top of the screen and the force to look up can increase the 
concentration of the user.  
Alternatively, active security interventions can be used, e.g. if no OSPS is provided then a warning is 
displayed. This warning requires the user to take actions before continuing.  However, nowadays 
active security interventions do not support users’ decision on the trustworthiness of a Web service 
either.  There are many reasons for this, like too many false positives, i.e., warnings that are 
displayed although the risk is very low, causing the habit of always ignoring warnings.  Thus, another 
challenge of OSPSs is how to communicate them in a way that they are perceived by the user 
(Challenge 3). 
Furthermore, privacy and security requirements are in fact multi-dimensional and continuous. 
Hence, the result of the evaluation is neither trustworthy ‘yes/no’ nor a single scalar ‘x% 
trustworthy’. It is clear that these multi-dimensional and continuous results of the evaluation need 
to be communicated appropriately to the user (Challenge 4).  
Finally, currently, it is easy for users to get confused by the meaning and need for OSPS because 
nowadays there exists a small, but market dominating number of highly trusted services that do not 
carry any OSPS, such as amazon and eBay (Challenge 5). 
However, this situation puts a high burden on upcoming services. From a user perspective, this is 
undesirable since monopolized markets tend to result in higher prices. But even from the market 
leaders point of view the situation is problematic: a fraudulent service provider, that knows on 
which signals users bases their trust, can easily imitate the look and feel of a trusted service and by 
this profit from their reputation. This finally will harm the reputation of the initially trusted service. 
The challenge is, how OSPS can reach a high enough coverage over all services in such a way that an 
uncertified service looks at least suspicious, if not untrusted at all. 
4.2 Solutions 
In this section we present solutions and ideas to address the challenges presented above. 
Solution 1. First of all, a basic training and raising awareness of these processes is needed. This can 
also be in terms of advertisements on different media. User recognition can be improved if OSPSs 
are awarded by companies which the users know and are reputed in terms of security. 
                                                          
25
 https://addons.mozilla.org/de/firefox/addon/linkextend-safety-kidsafe-site/ 
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Solution 2. It is also important to motivate users to consider OSPSs and inform themselves about 
consequences if they do not.  This is challenging as well, as statistics show that although Internet 
users express high levels of concern about cyber security they frequently become victims of cyber-
attacks26. Therefore it is important to consider users’ Mental Models on Internet Security. Note, this 
is also necessary when communicating the results.  
Solution 3. Standardisation is needed where OSPSs are displayed. In order to ensure that these 
symbols are displayed at the same position for any webpage, they should be loaded into the browser 
pane.27 Thus, it is necessary, to convince browser developers to enable this and in particular 
display all OSPSs in the same way in order to make it easier for users to recognize them. Studies 
need to be conducted on how to display them to make sure that users notice them. E.g., as 
attention increases by movements the OSPSs in the browser pane could ‘blink’ once before 
being displayed constantly.   
Solution 4. The different aspects of the evaluation result need to be communicated in an 
understandable way. As there is limited space and users are generally not willing to read long 
explanations, it is recommended to develop corresponding icons communicating the results. When 
developing such icons, further challenges have to be met: The icons can only be effective if they are 
both individualized (including demographics28 and personality as well as mental model29 about 
threats, risks and who is the target of attacks) and contextualized30 (e.g. electronic banking versus 
information searching) and taking the identified trust signals (see Challenge 2).  Note, designers of 
such icons need to take care of cultural and legal differences in case of European wide OSPSs. 
As a starting point for the development of icons representing the possible results of the OSPS 
issuer’s evaluation one can consider the research on policy icons that graphically represent elements 
of privacy policies of services.  They aim to make policies easily understandable for the end user. An 
overview of the conducted research and research results is provided in Annex B0.  . 
Solution 5. For Challenge 5 (i.e. big players do not go for an OSPSs and thereby confuse users 
regarding the need of OSPS) enforcement can be a solution. In this area, a number of different 
options exist to provide incentives for the analysed party to increase transparency for the service 
offering, and to improve their software and service in terms of security and privacy.  Similar 
conditions can be found in business contracts that require such an assessment. For example, the 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)31, which applies to organizations that 
accept, process, store and transmit credit and debit card data, requires that merchants and service 
providers implement a comprehensive security program.  Violating PCI DSS may lead to fines from 
the card brands, and even worse civil liabilities32.  
Another option is self-regulation. Self-regulation implies web service providers to be aware and deal 
diligently with security and privacy related issues without the mandatory existence of government 
regulation or enforcement mechanisms. This self-regulation in security and privacy can come into 
existence due to several reasons: to increase user confidence, to differentiate from competitors, as a 
                                                          
26 Special Eurobarometer 390 / Wave EB77.2 EU citizens’ experience and perceptions of cyber security issues 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_399_380_en.htm 
27 Compare to the lock symbol of ssl. 
28 Fogg, B., Marshall, J., Laraki, O., Osipovich, A., Varma, C., Fang, N., Paul, J., et al. (2001). What makes Web sites credible?: a report on a 
large quantitative study. Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems (pp. 61–68). 
29 Fogg, B. J. (2003). Prominence-interpretation theory: explaining how people assess credibility online. CHI EA ’03 (pp. 722–723). New 
York, NY, USA: ACM. doi:10.1145/765891.765951 
30 Towards the Systematic Development of Contextualized Security Interventions: Steffen Bartsch and Melanie Volkamer; In: Designing 
Interactive Secure Systems (DISS), BCS HCI 2012, 2012. 
31 Although PCI DSS was created by credit card companies it has been adopted (via reference or in parts) in actual law in some regions. For 
example, Nevada mandates complicance with PCI DSS since 2010, as described in http://bit.ly/M31FAZ. 
32 The DatalossDB is a project aiming to document data breaches world-wide, see http://datalossdb.org/.  
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way of increasing corporate social responsibility, etc.  However, self-regulation means privacy and 
security standards are enhanced on a voluntary basis. This may not be the preferred approach of 
users, which probably would rather have an independent third party supervising that their privacy 
and security is protected, and therefore attesting that the online service meets some certain 
minimum standards. Furthermore, pure self-regulation is not an option in territories where there is 
personal data protection legislation, as some sort of mechanism must exist in order to enforce 
regulation compliance, and to protect citizens when their rights are not respected. 
A mixed approach is also possible, with self-assessment being conducted regularly in order to 
produce a constant improvement cycle, while third party assessment being done periodically to 
review policies and procedures against standards and to independently evaluate the level of security 
and privacy protection in place. 
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5 Verification of online security and privacy seals 
OSPS issuers have (and publically provide) a list of issued seals, including the information when the 
seal was issued and for how long. They also provide information about how they evaluated the Web 
services and according to which requirements. As there are many issuers, it is not practical for the 
user to check on all their web pages whether the visited Web service is listed on any or not. 
Therefore, the Web services integrate a corresponding pictogram on their web pages. As these 
pictograms usually contain the logo of the issuing company it is easy to recognize who the OSPS 
issuer is. In order to check the details and the seals authenticity, a link is integrated in a way that 
when clicking on an authentic pictogram one is forwarded to the issuer’s web page and in particular 
the web page provides information about the corresponding Web service. As faked pictograms may 
also forward the user to a page that looks like the OSPS issuer’s web page, the user also needs to 
check whether the visited page is authentic.  
5.1 Challenges 
In a UK study33 the researchers observed that many users did not check the validity of OSPSs or 
whether they were merely an image. This shows that forgeries are possible – just by displaying a 
corresponding seal icon on the web page. However, distrust was mentioned by some participants as 
seals are perceived as easily spoofed or faked. These participants are not aware that they could 
check the seals. This is not too surprising as a couple of Web services still do not properly integrate 
their legitimate OSPS. Here, the pictogram is only presented as an image by the web page, but not 
actually linked to the OSPS issuer (Challenge 1). 
Those users who know that they need to check the validity of displayed OSPS’s pictograms are also 
not very likely to check its legitimacy, as well as to check the evaluated requirements and used 
evaluation methods because of the effort and time to do so and the fact that also for them the first 
goal is not security but e.g. to buy something on the internet (Challenge 2). 
However, even if the information is displayed in an understandable way, it might still be the case 
that the user is unable to compare this with his own preferences (Challenge 3). 
5.2 Solutions 
Solution 1 and 2. First two challenges can be addressed by integrating automatic checks in the Web 
browser. In case a Web service gets an OSPS, it includes some corresponding information in its web 
pages. This information is transferred to the browser. The browser checks its validity and the 
value/quality of the evaluation automatically. In case the Web service owns a valid OSPS the 
corresponding information is displayed (ideally as icon in the browser chrome). Note, it is assumed 
that the Web browser is trustworthy.  
Solution 3. Besides checks on the authenticity the browser needs to compare the user’s privacy 
preferences automatically.  This is only possible if the OSPS comes with a machine readable 
component. Researchers have proposed (semi) structured formats for legal documents to make 
them (a) easier to understand for ordinary users and (b) to make them automatically checkable. A 
comparative study was presented in 2009 by Mcdonald et.al.34   
                                                          
33 I. Kirlappos, A. Sasse, N. Harvey; Why trust seals don’t work: A study of user perception and behaviour, University College London, 
Department of Computer Science 
34
Mcdonald, Aleecia M., et al. "A comparative study of online privacy policies and formats." Privacy enhancing 
technologies. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009 
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6 Economic aspects  
The concept of OSPS faces economic challenges. OSPSs are intended to improve the user’s decision 
by providing additional information in terms of compliance with security and privacy standards. 
Hence OSPSs are intended to reduce information asymmetries between Web services providers and 
users.  
In many cases, OSPS serve as justification for increasing the price charged to the users. For example, 
users who are sensitive to security and privacy standards are willing to pay more for using an 
evaluated Web service However, the economics of OSPSs shows that such hopes could be 
disappointed, because OSPSs introduce new asymmetries and are not always playing a role in a 
user’s purchase decision, cf. Section 4. 
There are a number of advantages of OSPSs, but there are also disadvantages. There is the potential 
to increase the Web service providers’ incentives to improve on standards. However, this will only 
be the case if the characteristic in question (technical security or privacy) weighs heavy in a user’s 
decision. In this case, it has no reputation-improving impact that is reflected in greater sales. If 
obtaining an OSPS does not translate into measurable effects in sales, firms will not have an 
economic incentive to invest in this signal.  
 
Supply side: Web Service Provider Demand side: Users 
Advantages: 
 Possibility of credible signalling 
 Increase of reputation and trust 
 Incentive to improve product/service quality 
regarding data protection 
 Differentiation in competition & decrease in 
competition 
 External evaluation mechanism that can reveal 
weaknesses in processes in firms (quality assurance) 
 Internal risk control optimization 
Advantages: 
 Credible quality sign, higher protection of users 
 Additional variable in the purchase decision 
 Increase in comparability 
 Increase in choice (if firms differentiate) 
 Decrease in information costs 
 Generation of data protection awareness and risk 
awareness, priming on security issue 
Disadvantages: 
 Increase in investment expenditures to obtain a 
seal or trust mark 
 Minimum standards can act as market barriers, if 
there are low-end providers that do not fulfill the standards 
 Possible justification for price rises 
 Sunk investment in seals, if they play no role in a 
user’s decision 
Disadvantages: 
 Additional variable can further complicate 
decisions/comparisons 
 Seals must not increase transparency if 
certification mechanisms are not transparent  
 Low-quality demand might not be satisfied if 
there are minimum standards  
Table 1 Advantages and Disadvantages of OSPS
35
 
By this, additional information asymmetries are introduced as users do not know whether they can 
trust a particular OSPS or not. If firms can obtain an OSPS too easily, many will do so, which devalues 
the OSPS as a signal of quality. Users then may opt to ignore the OSPS. If standards are set fairly high 
by the OSPS issuer, not many firms obtain the OSPS and it will not develop into a profitable business 
for the issuer. Competition between the latter might reduce the standards for OSPS granting 
procedures as the issuers try to obtain market share in the market for OSPSs. This is especially the 
case, if evaluated firms can be bound contractually through renewal clauses and therefore can be 
                                                          
35 Source: Jentzsch, N. (2012) Was können Datenschutz-Gütesiegel leisten? Wirtschaftsdienst, June 2012, Vol. 92, Issue 6, pp. 413-419, 
with author’s modifications. 
On the security, privacy and usability of online seals 
An overview 
 
Version December 2013 
 
Page  16 
locked-in by the issuer. Thus where firms compete in the market for OSPSs, it may exacerbate the 
situation it is supposed to improve. 
Regulators may prevent the latter by setting minimum standards for OSPS-issuing as well as for the 
experts that evaluate firms in terms of skill sets requested. Moreover, the latter as well as the 
payment structure regarding the OSPSs should be transparent and open to the public for scrutiny. As 
discussed in the part on policy context in this report, the latest version of the Data Protection 
Directive only requires that the institution granting the seal or mark must ensure there are formal 
procedures of granting and revoking the OSPS. Moreover, the draft regulation demands that the 
granting institution also ensures independence. It states that certification criteria, results, and 
summary justifications must be made readily available to the public.36 
It is intended to ensure that interested users are able to judge the granting-process themselves as 
well as potential conflicts of interest. For example, if an OSPS-issuer is paid by the evaluated firm, 
there might be a conflict of interest resulting in a positive evaluation. This ought to be made public 
as well. 
At this point in time, little is known about how users include OSPSs in their decision-making process 
in general. There are a few empirical and experiment works (in the area of privacy), but they are 
based on a rather low number of subjects. Other works are often not conducted under ‘clinical 
conditions’ (i.e. laboratory), which do not allow for cause-effect analyses. Therefore, there are a 
number of open questions. For example, we do not know whether an OSPS increases the willingness 
to pay for a product or service. We also do not know whether it increases the inclination to 
purchase, although the firm also has a privacy policy. In addition, little is known about the ratio of 
accepted and rejected firms at the granting institution.  
While OSPSs have the potential to improve the variety of products/services in the market, they will 
only do so if users appreciate them. Moreover, whereas they bear the potential for justification of 
price increases, companies will only invest in such OSPSs if they see that there is a critical mass of 
users in the market willing to pay for price-mark-ups. Regulators can improve the environment for 
such OSPSs by setting minimum standards for the quality of such certificates, as well as standards for 
the accreditation of experts. It is clear that potential conflicts of interest between the OSPS-seeking 
as well as granting institution ought to be avoided. In the worst case, OSPSs lead to increased prices, 
confused users who ignore them and non-transparent OSPS-granting procedures. The first step, 
therefore, would be to find out whether OSPSs are relevant in user decisions. 
Theoretically, OSPSs have the potential of lowering information asymmetries, but at the same time 
they have the potential to introduce new ones. They can act as an OSPS of differentiation, but again 
in order to become such they must be meaningful and important as a mechanism to support a user’s 
decision.  
It is questionable whether it will be possible to establish a unified international standard of a privacy 
OSPS. The reason is that there are a number of different regulatory regimes, at the EU level, the 
national regimes, regional standards, and industry standards.  
Differentiated demand is the reason why in the past a variety of OSPSs were created. While the 
variety can be confusing, a user can often only compare whether a firm has an OSPS or not, not 
whether one OSPS provides stronger protection than another. 
A regulator should keep track of the conflicts of interest that may arise between certifying 
institutions and certified firms. Otherwise, phenomena arise like in the financial services industry 
                                                          
36
 Article 39 of the proposed Data Protection Regulation, available at:   http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf   
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between rating-demanding firms and rating agencies, where the latter are dependent on generating 
profits from the former.  
It is recommended to perform first tests on the effect of OSPSs on user decisions in the laboratory 
and in field experiments in order to understand their impact regarding the purchase of goods and 
services. In this area, evidence-based policy is definitely a good thing, before setting up expensive 
and large-scale certification schemes. The research could also inform decision makers about the best 
design for such OSPSs. Again, the design and its interaction with user decisions should be analysed 
first. 
If OSPSs do not play a role in user decisions in the market, the hope to find market-discipline effects 
through privacy/security certification will not be realised. An evidence-based approach could 
prevent the misrouting of investments into efforts that will in the medium term not lead to a greater 
protection of users in terms of technical security and data protection. 
  
On the security, privacy and usability of online seals 
An overview 
 
Version December 2013 
 
Page  18 
7 Summary and recommendations 
The ultimate goal of online security and privacy seals (OSPS) is to make service offerings more 
secure and privacy friendly.  In this report, we analysed under which conditions OSPSs can support 
users to make an informed decision on the trustworthiness of a service and its provider. We 
sketched the chain of trust, namely evaluation of the Web service provider, communication of the 
result of the evaluation and verification of the authenticity of a communicated OSPS, which needs 
to be established from the seal issuer to the user’s awareness. We started with a short review of 
current regulations that mention such seals as a means to establish trust. Furthermore, we analysed 
the three stages of the trust chain and detailed out challenges and sketched solutions and 
recommendations. 
The main identified challenges on the user side are that they:  
 do not know the general concepts of OSPS, 
 do not understand what the signals stand for (e.g., data protection, security, service/product 
quality) including what has been evaluated (scope) and how (which methods were in place) 
as well as when and how often are services re-evaluated (and the meaning of a possibly 
years old assessment), 
 are not aware of the need of checking the authenticity of OSPS and how do this, 
 do not check, although they know, as it is too much effort and it takes too much time to do 
so. 
In addition, it is challenging to identify proper standards both for the evaluation and the 
accreditation of OSPS issuers. This is because   they should be appropriate to base decisions on 
them, but  they cannot be too expensive as then only big players can afford them. As such, different 
levels of assessment seem to be appropriate; however then it is even more challenging to 
communicate the multi-dimensional results to the end users in an understandable way, for example 
using icons and other graphical representations, to convey differences to end users.   
We proposed and discussed solutions and derive the following recommendations:  
 EU or international standards for evaluation are required to address all the above 
challenges. Due to different types of services and due to different budget limitations for 
such an evaluation, different levels or categories are required and should be considered by 
such a standard.  
 Browser developers need to implement these standards for automatic checks. 
 Additional information also needs to be adequately represented by the online security and 
privacy seal. In order to facilitate the comparison of certificates, the EC could issue work on 
traffic light systems that enable vertical comparisons relating to the strength of protection 
granted by a product or service.  
 Policy makers should investigate enforcement strategies in case promises made with seals 
are not met. This is particularly important for those cases when regulatory enforcement is 
chosen as a preferred approach. 
 Further research is needed to better understand user behaviour regarding passive and 
active security interventions.  New strategies and new interventions need to be provided 
that are more effective than the current ones. This should be individualized and 
contextualized. 
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 Further work is needed for improving the awareness of the users on OSPS but also on 
security signals in general; as well as the level of understanding on how they are functioning 
and on how seals can be checked / validated.  ENISA should continue this activity by 
attempting to increase the awareness of these issues.  
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Annex A:  Relevant Factors for the Evaluation 
Evaluation ( assessments or analysis) is the basis for any OSPS. It is important to know the different 
relevant factors of an evaluation and how they influence each other. The different factors and 
corresponding sub aspects are shown in Figure 2 and they are described in the subsequent 
paragraphs. 
Structure of the 
Analysis
Scope
Granularity
Cost Coverage
Analysing Party
Type of Analysis
Baseline for 
Analysis
Validity Period
Human Resource Skills
Software Source Code
Process Maturity
End Customer Visible 
Service
Terms of Service / 
Privacy Notice
Protocol Properties
Predefined Scope
Specific Product
Company
Valid unless software/
service changes
Specified timeframe
For service invocation 
only
No defined validity period
Independent Third Party
Self-Assessment
Contractor
Computer Program
Legal Framework
Predefined Scope
Independent Party
Analysed Party
No costs occur
Others
Scope Definition
Regulator / Enforcement 
Agency
Industry Consortium
Standardization Body
Independent Party
Analysed Party
Automatic Analysis
Manual Analysis
 
Figure 2: High level decision aspects. 
A.1 Scope 
With the analysis of software and services, the scope of the analysis plays an important role in the 
amount of effort it takes and the type of procedures involved.  The possibilities are broad ranging 
from the analysis of single protocol properties to skills of personnel working in a company.  
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For an automated analysis, the choices are limited to a more restricted scope but may lead to a real-
time result. Still, there are a number of popular examples of automated analysis techniques. A 
known example is the HTTPS lock icon, which results from a successful SSL/TLS handshake that offers 
channel security and authentication of the Web server. Another example of an automated analysis is 
the EFF “Terms of Service” tracker37 that keeps track of changes in privacy notices of big Internet 
websites and publishes the changes for the end users. 
The analysis of complete service offerings, such as privacy notices, human resource skills, and 
process maturity, often requires human involvement. Consequently, it is more time consuming. For 
example, the “Terms of Service; Didn’t Read” project38 aims to summarize privacy notices of popular 
online services based on the observations that most end users do not read the terms of service since 
they are typically hard to read, difficult to find, and fairly long. The Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard (PCI DSS), as another example, also requires significant personnel resources even 
in case of self-assessments39, which is applicable for merchants with a low number of annual credit 
card transactions. 
Furthermore, it may not be possible to carry out some analysis without special privileges, such as 
access to source code or company-internal documentation. Thus, the scope of the analysis is linked 
to the type of analysis conducted (e.g., who the analysis party is).  
A.2 Baseline for analysis 
Since the security and privacy requirements vary between jurisdiction and also between sector (e.g., 
healthcare industry, financial industry, etc.), the following question could be raised: What baseline 
reference is suitable when analysing products and services:  Should the product or service be 
assessed against  generic privacy principles, for example, the OECD privacy principles or the Madrid 
resolution, or rather against specific data protection and/or security regulation? Choosing generic 
principles can be advantageous because it gives the service providers more freedom to demonstrate 
compliance with sound principles. Due to the global nature of the Internet and the desire of many 
companies to reach a maximum number of users this offers benefits regardless of the specific 
location of a given end user. However, the benefit of using a specific security and privacy regulation 
is that compliance is achieved with the assessment, which, for many service providers that are 
bound to comply with a certain regulation, can be a driving force to conduct the assessments. More 
narrow focused regulation and assessment programs are often more detailed in terms of what a 
specific service provider needs to fulfil. For example, PCI-DSS assessment is done based on detailed 
instructions on how to secure the network infrastructure categorized into six control objectives40. 
A.3 Type of analysis 
Automated analysis (e.g. the use of automatic vulnerability analysis tools) can detect actual security 
deficiencies in web pages that could be exploited by malicious users to either gain access or destroy 
private information. On the other hand, manual assessment (e.g. reviewing the privacy and security 
policies) can be more effective in assessing the general management procedures of the web page 
when dealing with data from their users. Neither approach is perfect: the use of both of them 
simultaneously should offer the best results in terms of protection of private information. 
                                                          
37 TOSBack – The terms-of-service tracker: http://tosback.org 
38 Terms of Service; Didn’t Read – http://tosdr.org  
39 PCI DSS Self-Assessment Questionnaire – https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/pci_dss_saq_instr_guide_v2.0.pdf  
40 The six control objectives, namely “build and maintain a secure network”, “protect cardholder data” “maintain a vulnerability 
management program”, “implement strong access control measures”, “implement strong access control measures”, “regularly monitor 
and test networks”, “maintain an information security policy”, are briefly summarized at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Payment_Card_Industry_Data_Security_Standard. A more detailed description can be found in the PCI DSS 
standard itself: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/pci_dss_v2.pdf 
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A good privacy policy and security management practices would lead to a more securely designed 
environment. However, undetected vulnerabilities often do exist.  Vice versa, a securely designed 
and operated web page may not mean much in terms of privacy if the policy of the company is faulty 
(e.g. the web page provides personal data given by users to external parties without their explicit 
consent). 
However, the more complete and profound the analysis is the more associated cost it will have. This 
may not be feasible to implement for some web pages that belong to minor entities in terms of size 
or resources. A balanced approach should be taken, bringing into consideration both the sensitivity 
of the data and the technological environment. 
A.4 Cost coverage 
Many, although not all assessments, incur costs to the participating parties. In particular, if the 
assessment requires humans to perform the assessment then costs can be potentially quite high. 
The cost of the assessment will also be determined by the depth of the analysis, as well as, the 
extend of the service offering, and the frequency of the assessment. The costs, however, are not 
necessarily paid by the party that is audited. Magazines often publish product comparisons and 
perform a variety of assessments without being paid by the company whose products are analysed. 
An example of such a magazine is Stiftung Warentest41, but many other magazines, blogs, and daily 
newspapers provide similar product reviews. Sometimes the costs are covered as part of research 
grants and, as those funding source drain away these services tend to slow down in their level of 
activity or cease to exist.  
Not all organizations releasing software libraries on the Internet have the financial means to pay for 
a security and privacy assessment. This includes many of the open source activities and individual 
developers contributing their code to the public. Many of the core Internet infrastructure services 
are available as open source software, such as OpenSSL42, GnuTLS43, BIND44, Apache45, OpenIKEv246, 
FreeRADIUS47. Of course, security and privacy aspects are being addressed in those development 
events, but in the same style as the rest as the software development, i.e., based on contributions 
by other developers rather than via compliance to certification programs.   
A more detailed discussion of the economic aspects can be found in Section 6. 
A.5 Validity period 
Software and services frequently change; this often includes changes of the security and privacy 
properties.  This change is not only due to technological changes but also due to changes in the 
organizational structure and the goals businesses try to achieve.  Updates to services and products 
may be required due to the collecting and processing of additional or different customer data, may 
respond to changes in the regulator environment (e.g., due to new data protection regulation), and 
maybe reflect new business models. 
All of this implies that privacy assessments should be conducted on a periodical basis in order for 
their results to be valid.  Nonetheless, the periodicity may not necessarily be fixed, but could be 
                                                          
41 Stiftung Warentest offers a wide range of product comparisons, many of which are unrelated to privacy or security. However, some 
tests are specifically focused on online services and their privacy properties.  See, for example, http://www.test.de/thema/datenschutz/.  
42 OpenSSL Library: http://www.openssl.org/ 
43 GnuTLS Library: http://www.gnutls.org/ 
44 Bind Domain Name Server: http://www.isc.org/downloads/bind/ 
45 Apache: http://www.apache.org/  
46 OpenIKEv2: http://openikev2.sourceforge.net/  
47 FreeRADIUS: http://freeradius.org/ 
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adjustable.  What a suitable timeframe for a re-assessment should be and who decides about such 
the triggers that demand such a re-evaluation is difficult to state in general.   
Annex B:  Privacy icons 
Privacy Icons have been studied a lot both in the privacy policy and the privacy preference context. 
An overview of this research is provided in this section.  
Privacy policy icons 
Privacy policy icons have been researched and developed for visualising policy elements in privacy 
policies stated for websites with the objective of making the content of legal policy statements 
easier to access and comprehend.  Privacy policies containing lengthy legal phrases are usually, if 
they are read at all, not comprehensible to most end users48, 49.  One of the 10 Usability Heuristics 
for User Interface Design defined by Jakob Nielsen is the “match between system and the real 
world”50. A user interface which uses real-world metaphors, e.g. in form of suitable icons, is easier to 
learn and understand.  This section first discusses policy icons that graphically present elements of 
privacy policies of services sides for making policies more transparent and easily understandable. 
Finally, an example for icons expressing the user’s privacy preferences is given.  
Policy icons should be based on semiotic studies and preferably be standardised and usable across 
cultures.  However, the policy aspects for which icons can be helpful vary across legal regimes. 
Moreover, icons in form of symbols that are well understood in one cultural domain are not 
necessarily understood by other cultures. 
Creative Commons-like policy icons were proposed by Rundle51, which, however, were mainly 
targeted at the US American legal privacy regime and not matching with European privacy principles. 
For instance, her icon set included icons for indicting that a services side takes reasonable steps to 
keep a user’s data secure and grants users the right to access their data. However, according to the 
EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, services sides have a legal obligation to take reasonable 
measures to secure personal data (Art. 17) and to grant data subjects access to their data (Art. 10) – 
hence in Europe, these rights and obligations are anyhow mandatory privacy rules and thus do not 
need to be displayed prominently by icons.  
Further Creative Common-like privacy icons have been initiated by Aza Raskin and further developed 
by a Mozilla-led working group with further contributors from Stanford and Disconnect.me52, which 
should as standardised and legal declarations backed up by clear legal definitions be able to replace 
complex legal documents. However, the Mozilla privacy icon project has not reported any further 
results since 2011. Both Mary Rundle’s icon set and the set of the Mozilla icons (displayed in Figure 
3) target the US privacy regulations, hence they are not suitable to display the core policy 
information that is required by Art. 10 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Furthermore, policy 
statements such as that a website “might keep your data indefinitively” do not comply with the data 
minimisation principle that can be derived from the EU Directive. Nonetheless, it is notable that it 
includes special icons informing end user about how easily web sites are cooperating with requests 
by law enforcement. As already pointed out by the Art. 29 Working Party on their Opinion on Cloud 
                                                          
48 Jensen, C. and Potts, J., Privacy policies as decision-making tools: An Evaluation of online privacy notices, in CHI 2004, 6, 471-478, 2004 
49 Protor, R., Ali, A., Vu, K.-P. L., Information requested by Web Sites and User’s comprehension of Privacy Policies, Poster Proceedings of 
the Symposium of Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2006), July 14-16, 2006, Pittsburgh, PA 
50 Nielsen, J. 10 Usability Heuristics for User Interface Design. January 2005. http://www.nngroup.com/articles/ten-usability-heuristics/ 
51 Mary Rundle, “International Data Protection and Digital Identity Management Tools”, presentation at IGF 2006, Privacy Workshop I, 
Athens, 2006, available online: http://identityproject.lse.ac.uk/mary.pdf 
52 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy_Icons 
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Computing (cf. section 2.2) and as it also became apparent after the revelation of the PRISM 
program; this is an important aspect that is often not transparent to end users. 
 
Figure 3: Beta version of proposed privacy Icons developed by a Mozilla- led working group (see: 
https://icons.disconnect.me/icons)  
Within the scope of the PrimeLife EU project, a set of policy icons addressing the legal transparency 
requirements of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC has been developed by the Independent 
Center for Privacy Protection in Kiel/Germany, which can be used illustrate core privacy policy 
statements, namely statements about what types of data are collected/processed, for what 
purposes, and what are the processing steps53.  
An intercultural comparison test of the PrimeLife policy icons was conducted at Karlstad University in 
the form of a paper mock-up test with 17 Swedish and 17 Chinese students, which gave insights into 
which icons seem to be well understandable and which require improvements54. Icons, which were 
by most of the Swedish and Chinese students associated with the correct policy element and thus 
were understood well by both test user groups, were the following ones displaying types of data 
(personal data, medical data, payment data), the purpose “shipping” and the processing steps 
(storage, retention). 
                                                          
53 Holtz, L., Nocun, K., Hansen, M. Displaying privacy information with icons. In Fischer-Hübner, S. et al.: Proceedings of the PrimeLife/IFIP 
Summer School 2010, Helsingborg, 2-6 August 2010, Springer 2011 
54 
Fischer-Hübner, S., Zwingelberg, H. UI Prototypes: Policy Administration and Presentation – Version 2. PrimeLife, Deliverable D4.3.2, 
June 2010. www.primelife.eu 
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Figure 4 Example of understood PrimeLife policy icons by test participants with different cultural backgrounds 
However, the tests also showed that the test persons with different cultural backgrounds had 
different understandings of some of the icons. While Swedish test persons had for instance no 
problems in understanding the “post horn” as an icon for the purpose “shipping”, this icon was not 
understood by Chinese test persons. These tests demonstrated well that finding privacy icons that 
are well understood by different cultures is a special challenge.  
The policy generator tool by Iubenda55 also uses icons for types of data that are collected, purposes 
of use, and parties involved & contacts of the data controller along with some basic explanatory text 
in short policy notices that it is generating in addition to a link to a full text policy statement 
(following the Art. 29 Working Party’s Recommendation of multi-layered privacy notices56). The 
selection of icons is expressive enough to comply with legal transparency requirements of Art.10 EU 
Data protection Directive.   
 
Figure 5: Short privacy notice including icons created by the Iubenda privacy generator. 
Further proposals for icons complementing short privacy notices were suggested by the 
CommonTerms project 57  and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s NTIA (National 
Telecommunication & Information Administration) for mobile app short privacy notices58. The short 
privacy notices of these two approaches are however not presenting all information that Art.10 of 
the EU Data Protection Directive requires. 
On October 21, 2013, the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament approved a compromise text 
of the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation59. It includes the new Article 13a requiring 
that data controllers use standardised information policies for informing data subject on how 
                                                          
55 https://www.iubenda.com/en 
56 Art.29 Working Party: Opinion on More Harmonised Information Provisions 1198704/EN WP 100. (2004) 
57 http://commonterms.net 
58 http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_ui_comps_update_7.23.pdf 
59
 European Commission (2013). Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individual 
with regard to the pro-cessing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(COM(2012)0011 – C7 0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)). Compromise amendments on Articles 1-29. Passed 21 October 2013. 
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personal data is being collected, retained, and shared with third parties and how encryption is used.  
In an annex, graphical policy icons are provided to be used by standardised policies in yes/no icon 
based tables along with textual descriptions for informing data subjects about the policy particulars 
pursuant to the new Article 13a. This icon- based table structure of standardised policies was initially 
suggested and developed by the vice president of the European parliament Alexander Alvaro60, as 
depicted in the example in Error! Reference source not found. Error! Reference source not found.. 
 
Figure 6 Example of icon-based standardised information policy as suggested by Alexander Alvaro and as required by the 
compromise text of the proposed EU Data Protection Regulation 
While the approach of having standardised policy icons can facilitate an easier recognition and 
comparison of policy aspects, the icons of the compromise amendments do not seem to be very 
intuitive and not easily and unmistakably recognizable by their symbolic depictions (e.g., the first 
icon in Figure 4 could rather be (mis-)understood as symbolising that persons can be uniquely 
identified). Therefore, such icons should preferably undergo further HCI improvements and usability 
tests. 
Privacy preference icons 
Further icons sets for e-mail have been developed within the Privicons project and submitted as an 
Internet Draft to the IETF61 by researchers from Stanford and the PrimeLife EU project. Privicons are 
attached to emails and can express how a sender would like his email to be treated by the recipient 
(“washing tags for email privacy”)62. They are thus expressing aspects of the user’s privacy 
preferences in contrast to the privacy policy icons mentioned above, which are visualising aspects of 
a services side’s privacy policy. A Chrome extension for Privicon gmail icons has been developed63.  
                                                          
60
 Alvaro, A (2013). LIFECYCLE DATA PROTECTION MANAGEMENT – Ein Beitrag zur Anpassung der europäischen Datenschutzgesetzgebung 
an die Erfordernisse des 21. Jahrhunderts, 30. January 2013. http://www.alexander-alvaro.de/inhalte/lifecycle-data-protection-
management-ein-beitrag-zur-anpassung-der-europaischen-datenschutzgesetzgebung-an-die-erfordernisse-des-21-jahrhunderts/ 
61 König, U. and Schallaböck, J., Privacy Preferences for E-Mail Messages, Internet Draft, June 2012, draft-koenig-privicons-04, 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-koenig-privicons-04 
62 http://privicons.org/ 
63 https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/privicons-for-gmail/nijcfldbcfbngeclhklbgmjlnkiheled#detail/privicons-for-
gmail/nijcfldbcfbngeclhklbgmjlnkiheled 
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The Privicon initiative is thus concept-wise similar to the Do Not Track (DNT) approach64, which uses 
an http header field to express the user’s preference not to be tracked by web applications. 
 
Figure 7 e-mail preference icons. 
  
                                                          
64 W3C, Tracking Preference Expression (DNT), W3C Working Draft 30 April 2013, http://www.w3.org/TR/tracking-dnt/ 
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